Rory is a non-stipendiary College Lecturer in Contract Law at Lady Margaret Hall and is reading for the DPhil in Law at Balliol College.
Rory's DPhil research is about the law of subrogation, which allows one person to pretend to be another and rely on the latter's rights against a third party. This area of law is as strange as it sounds, but it is commercially important in areas including agency, banking, insurance, finance, and trusts. Furthermore, subrogation has been discussed in four UK Supreme Court decisions in as many years.
Rory's research asks why and when subrogation happens. In particular, orthodoxy in English law says that non-contractual subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment. Rory's DPhil examines what that means and whether it is correct. He is supervised by Prof Robert Stevens.
Rory enjoys computer programming and is interested in legal technology. He has worked as a research assistant on a text-mining project examining media coverage of tort law. Rory also maintains the OSCOLA LaTeX template.
2018-20 DPhil, Balliol College, University of Oxford
AHRC Doctoral Training Partnership Studentship and Balliol College McDougall Scholarship in Law: full funding of fees and living expenses
2018 MPhil in Law, Balliol College, University of Oxford
Co-supervised by Prof Robert Stevens and Dr Frederick Wilmot-Smith
Clarendon Scholarship and Balliol College Gregory Kulkes Scholarship in Law: full funding of fees and living expenses
2017 BCL (Distinction), Wadham College, University of Oxford
Peter Carter Taught Graduate Scholarship in Law
Keeley Senior Scholarship, Wadham College
2016 BA (Starred First, graduated top of his year), Christ's College, University of Cambridge
Slaughter and May Prize for best overall performance in Part II of the Law Tripos
- Many statutes confer discretionary powers upon public officials and authorities. Take any one of those powers. Must the official or authority exercise the power personally, or can the official or authority delegate the exercise of the power to a subordinate? For some powers, the statute will expressly answer this question. But what if the statute is silent? When should the courts find that the statute gives the official or authority an implied power to delegate? This article addresses that question in two parts. The first asks whether it is ever appropriate for a court to imply a power to delegate. The second asks, if so, in what circumstances? It is concluded that the courts do - and should - find that some statutes contain an implied power to delegate. The article then offers a detailed test to determine when they should do so.
Rory's DPhil research is in private law and he also has interests in administrative law, commercial law, legal history, and legal technology