Rory is a candidate for the DPhil in Law at Balliol College; a Non-Stipendiary College Lecturer in Contract Law at Lady Margaret Hall; and a Guest Teacher in the Law of Obligations at the London School of Economics.

Rory's research responds to pressing controversies in recent cases, aiming to persuade judges, legislators, and practitioners, in addition to his colleagues. Rory's work asks whether the law is achieving justice, taking inspiration from how different Common Law jurisdictions address the same problem and considering which is to be preferred.

Rory's DPhil investigates the law of subrogation, which allows one person to pretend to be another and rely on the latter's rights against a third party.  This area of law is as strange as it sounds, but it is commercially important in areas including agency, banking, insurance, finance, and trusts.  Furthermore, subrogation has been discussed in four UK Supreme Court decisions in as many years.

Rory's research asks why and when subrogation happens.  In particular, orthodoxy in English law says that non-contractual subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment.  Rory's DPhil examines what that means and whether it is correct.  He is supervised by Prof Robert Stevens.

Rory enjoys computer programming and is interested in legal technology.  He has worked as a research assistant on a text-mining project examining media coverage of tort law.  Rory also maintains the OSCOLA LaTeX template.



2018-20 DPhil, Balliol College, University of Oxford
Supervised by Prof Robert Stevens
AHRC Doctoral Training Partnership Studentship and Balliol College McDougall Scholarship in Law: full funding of fees and living expenses

2018 MPhil in Law, Balliol College, University of Oxford
Co-supervised by Prof Robert Stevens and Dr Frederick Wilmot-Smith
Clarendon Scholarship and Balliol College Gregory Kulkes Scholarship in Law: full funding of fees and living expenses

2017 BCL (Distinction), Wadham College, University of Oxford
Peter Carter Taught Graduate Scholarship in Law
Keeley Senior Scholarship, Wadham College

2016 BA (Starred First, graduated top of his year), Christ's College, University of Cambridge
Slaughter and May Prize for best overall performance in Part II of the Law Tripos


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  • Rory Gregson, 'Is Subrogation a Remedy for Unjust Enrichment?' (2020) LQR (forthcoming)
    D owes a debt to X. C’s money is paid to X, discharging D’s debt. In these circumstances, the law might give C new rights against D, which resemble X’s extinguished rights against D. This is called subrogation to extinguished rights, which this article calls “subrogation” for short. Subrogation is a strange thing for the law to do. C might deserve rights against D, but why should these rights resemble X’s extinguished rights? English law says that subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment. However, some commentators dissent from this view and, in the past four years, the UK Supreme Court has started to reconsider this position. This article argues that subrogation is not a remedy for unjust enrichment in the sense that is usually assumed, since it is not governed by the same rules as other remedies for unjust enrichment. In light of this, judges and scholars need to reconsider what the law of unjust enrichment is, and how it is unified.
  • Mindy Chen-Wishart and Rory Gregson, 'Impaired Intention Unjust Factors?' in Elise Bant, Kit Barker, and Simone Degeling (eds), Research Handbook on Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Hart Publishing 2020) (forthcoming)
  • Rory Gregson, 'When Should there be an Implied Power to Delegate?' (2017) PL 408
    Many statutes confer discretionary powers upon public officials and authorities. Take any one of those powers. Must the official or authority exercise the power personally, or can the official or authority delegate the exercise of the power to a subordinate? For some powers, the statute will expressly answer this question. But what if the statute is silent? When should the courts find that the statute gives the official or authority an implied power to delegate? This article addresses that question in two parts. The first asks whether it is ever appropriate for a court to imply a power to delegate. The second asks, if so, in what circumstances? It is concluded that the courts do - and should - find that some statutes contain an implied power to delegate. The article then offers a detailed test to determine when they should do so.

Research Interests

Rory's DPhil research is in private law and he also has interests in administrative law, commercial law, legal history, and legal technology

Options taught

Contract, Tort, Commercial Remedies

Research projects