D owes a debt to X. C’s money is paid to X, discharging D’s debt. In these circumstances, the law might give C new rights against D, which resemble X’s extinguished rights against D. This is called subrogation to extinguished rights, which this article calls “subrogation” for short.
Subrogation is a strange thing for the law to do. C might deserve rights against D, but why should these rights resemble X’s extinguished rights? English law says that subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment. However, some commentators dissent from this view and, in the past four years, the UK Supreme Court has started to reconsider this position.
This article argues that subrogation is not a remedy for unjust enrichment in the sense that is usually assumed, since it is not governed by the same rules as other remedies for unjust enrichment. In light of this, judges and scholars need to reconsider what the law of unjust enrichment is, and how it is unified.
Many statutes confer discretionary powers upon public officials and authorities. Take any one of those powers. Must the official or authority exercise the power personally, or can the official or authority delegate the exercise of the power to a subordinate? For some powers, the statute will expressly answer this question. But what if the statute is silent? When should the courts find that the statute gives the official or authority an implied power to delegate?
This article addresses that question in two parts. The first asks whether it is ever appropriate for a court to imply a power to delegate. The second asks, if so, in what circumstances? It is concluded that the courts do - and should - find that some statutes contain an implied power to delegate. The article then offers a detailed test to determine when they should do so.
