Biography
Rory is a Stipendiary Lecturer (Career Development) in Private Law at Pembroke College; a Stipendiary Lecturer in Law at Lady Margaret Hall; the Law Faculty's Opportunity Oxford Co-ordinator; and a DPhil candidate at Balliol College. He previously taught at the London School of Economics.
RESEARCH
Rory has publications in the Law Quarterly Review, Public Law, and the Research Handbook on Unjust Enrichment and Restitution. His work is included on a number of undergraduate reading lists. Rory's research asks whether the law is achieving justice, aiming to persuade judges, legislators, and practitioners in addition to his academic colleagues.
Rory's DPhil research is in private law. It investigates subrogation, which allows one person to pretend to be another and rely on the latter's rights against a third party. This is as strange as it sounds, but subrogation is commercially important in areas including agency, insurance, finance, and trusts. Subrogation often causes controversy in the courts; the question of whether subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment has divided the UK Supreme Court in four decisions in the last five years.
Rory's DPhil asks why and when subrogation happens. In particular, it interrogates the orthodox view that subrogation to extinguished rights is a remedy for unjust enrichment. Rory's DPhil is supervised by Professor Robert Stevens and is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.
TEACHING
Rory teaches across private law. At undergraduate level, he gives tutorials and classes in Contract, Land, Tort, and Trusts. At the Law Faculty, he delivers lectures in Contract. At postgraduate level, Rory teaches Commercial Remedies and Restitution of Unjust Enrichment to BCL and MJur students.
Rory has a number of teaching qualifications including the Developing Learning and Teaching qualification from the University of Oxford’s Centre for Teaching and Learning. This is externally accredited by SEDA and mapped to the UK Professional Standards Framework.
ADMINISTRATION AND OUTREACH
Rory is the Law Faculty's Opportunity Oxford Co-ordinator. Opportunity Oxford is the University's new flagship access programme, launched in July 2020. The scheme is for 20 undergraduate offer-holders from disadvantaged or underrepresented backgrounds. It takes place before the students’ first term in Oxford and builds the skills that they will need in their law degree. Rory is responsible for delivering this brand-new course. He designs the curriculum and course materials; delivers skills classes and tutorials; and is the primary contact for students and the teaching team.
As the maintainer of the OSCOLA LaTeX template, Rory updates the code and assists the growing number of users from around the world.
EDUCATION
2018-21 DPhil, Balliol College, University of Oxford
Supervised by Prof Robert Stevens
Full funding of fees, research, and living expenses by Arts and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Training Partnership Studentship and Balliol College McDougall Scholarship in Law
2018 MPhil in Law, Balliol College, University of Oxford
Co-supervised by Prof Robert Stevens and Dr Frederick Wilmot-Smith
Full funding of fees, research, and living expenses by Clarendon Scholarship and Balliol College Gregory Kulkes Scholarship in Law
2017 BCL (Distinction), Wadham College, University of Oxford
Peter Carter Taught Graduate Scholarship in Law
Keeley Senior Scholarship, Wadham College
2016 BA Law, Christ's College, University of Cambridge
Graduated top of a cohort of 222 students with a Starred First
Slaughter and May Prize for best overall performance in Part II of the Law Tripos
Publications
Recent additions
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Mindy Chen-Wishart and Rory Gregson, 'Impaired Intention Unjust Factors?' in Elise Bant, Kit Barker, and Simone Degeling (eds), Research Handbook on Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) -
Rory Gregson, 'Is Subrogation a Remedy for Unjust Enrichment?' (2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review 481 D owes a debt to X. C’s money is paid to X, discharging D’s debt. In these circumstances, the law might give C new rights against D, which resemble X’s extinguished rights against D. This is called subrogation to extinguished rights, which this article calls “subrogation” for short. Subrogation is a strange thing for the law to do. C might deserve rights against D, but why should these rights resemble X’s extinguished rights? English law says that subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment. However, some commentators dissent from this view and, in the past four years, the UK Supreme Court has started to reconsider this position. This article argues that subrogation is not a remedy for unjust enrichment in the sense that is usually assumed, since it is not governed by the same rules as other remedies for unjust enrichment. In light of this, judges and scholars need to reconsider what the law of unjust enrichment is, and how it is unified.Rory Gregson, 'When Should there be an Implied Power to Delegate?' [2017] Public Law 408 Many statutes confer discretionary powers upon public officials and authorities. Take any one of those powers. Must the official or authority exercise the power personally, or can the official or authority delegate the exercise of the power to a subordinate? For some powers, the statute will expressly answer this question. But what if the statute is silent? When should the courts find that the statute gives the official or authority an implied power to delegate? This article addresses that question in two parts. The first asks whether it is ever appropriate for a court to imply a power to delegate. The second asks, if so, in what circumstances? It is concluded that the courts do - and should - find that some statutes contain an implied power to delegate. The article then offers a detailed test to determine when they should do so.
Journal Article (2)
D owes a debt to X. C’s money is paid to X, discharging D’s debt. In these circumstances, the law might give C new rights against D, which resemble X’s extinguished rights against D. This is called subrogation to extinguished rights, which this article calls “subrogation” for short.
Subrogation is a strange thing for the law to do. C might deserve rights against D, but why should these rights resemble X’s extinguished rights? English law says that subrogation is a remedy for unjust enrichment. However, some commentators dissent from this view and, in the past four years, the UK Supreme Court has started to reconsider this position.
This article argues that subrogation is not a remedy for unjust enrichment in the sense that is usually assumed, since it is not governed by the same rules as other remedies for unjust enrichment. In light of this, judges and scholars need to reconsider what the law of unjust enrichment is, and how it is unified.
Many statutes confer discretionary powers upon public officials and authorities. Take any one of those powers. Must the official or authority exercise the power personally, or can the official or authority delegate the exercise of the power to a subordinate? For some powers, the statute will expressly answer this question. But what if the statute is silent? When should the courts find that the statute gives the official or authority an implied power to delegate?
This article addresses that question in two parts. The first asks whether it is ever appropriate for a court to imply a power to delegate. The second asks, if so, in what circumstances? It is concluded that the courts do - and should - find that some statutes contain an implied power to delegate. The article then offers a detailed test to determine when they should do so.
Chapter (1)
Research Interests
Private law, remedies, commercial law, administrative law, legal history.
