The governance framework to deal with water scarcity and drought contains a clear commitment to evidence-based legal decision-making. However, we know little about whether and how key decision-makers actually make use of environmental science and economic knowledge, for example in order to decide how to write their drought plan or how to apply for a drought order. In this context the puzzle that I am interested to explore is the tension between the idea of the law as a powerful, interventionist tool for regulating the abstraction and use of water, and the idea of the law as a set of regulatory principles dependent on the conclusions of scientific reasoning.


Dry saltmarsh pan with cracking after drought Bridgewater Bay NNR Severn Estuary Somerset, England, August 2009
Dry saltmarsh pan with cracking after drought Bridgewater Bay NNR Severn Estuary Somerset, England, August 2009
The puzzle prompts the exploration of the hybrid nature of state law. On the one hand it is powerful by virtue of being capable of streeing those whose behaviour is subject to legal rights and duties and often backed by sanctions, but on the other hand it is powerless unless informed and rendered legitimate by relevant scientific expertise. hence, exploring the question of how environmental science and economic reasoning inform legal decision-making in relation to the governance of water scarcity and drought informs a range of socio-legal debates that are not just topical but wider, fascinating and even fundamental. First, the fact-value distinction, which has been central to understanding and criticising legal decision-making for environmental regulation. It has been argued that facts are assembled in specific ways and can contain implicit value judegments.

The question then is how does the fact-value distinction play out in practice when it comes to legal decision-making in relation to water scarcity and drought? Second, there is rich socio-legal literature arguing that law has its own ways of reflecting the social world. That argument can be extended to ways of reflecting the natural world. This raises questions about whether environmental-scientific and economic thinking about water scarcity and drought are distinct from law's conceptualization of water scarcity and drought, and ultimatelty what the relationship between scientific and legal reasoning is.


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